We study two-player contests in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf; neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the delegates choose their effort levels. We obtain first the outcomes of this unobservablecontracts case. Next, we perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize. Finally, we compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case. We find, among other things, that the unobservability of delegation contracts narrows the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation.
Introduction
Delegation in a contest a situation in which, in order to win a prize, each player or contestant  hires a delegate to expend effort or resources on the player's behalf can be readily observed all  around us. Examples include attorney delegation in litigation, lobbyist delegation in rent-1 seeking contests, researcher delegation in patent contests, and strategic managerial delegation.
In some contests, delegation occurs because it is compulsory. In others, delegation may occur because players want to use superior ability of delegates, and/or try to achieve strategic commitments.
In contests with delegation, one may well expect that delegates may choose their effort levels without observing the rival parties' delegation contracts. This unobservability of delegation contracts may occur because the parties do not announce their delegation contracts, or because their announced delegation contracts are not verifiable. For example, in litigation between a plaintiff and a defendant in which each litigant hires an attorney to expend effort on the litigant's behalf, the attorney for each side may choose his effort level without observing the contract of the other side.
Accordingly, the purpose of this paper is to study contests with delegation in which delegation contracts are private information. To the best of our knowledge, such contests with delegation have not previously been studied.
We study two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which neither party's delegation contract is revealed to the rival party when the two delegates choose their effort levels.
Specifically, we set up and analyze the following game. First, the players hire delegates and independently write contracts with their delegates. Next, the delegates choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently, each choosing his effort level without observing the contract for his counterpart. Finally, the winning player is determined, and each player pays compensation to her delegate according to her contract for him. The players use contracts that condition delegates' compensation on the outcome, win or lose, of the contest. The probability that a player wins the prize depends on the delegates' effort levels.
We solve the game called the unobservable-contracts case treating it as a   simultaneous-move game between the two parties. Then, we examine how the outcomes of the 2 game respond when the ratio of the players' valuations for the prize changes more specifically,  when the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize changes, . Finally, we ceteris paribus compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case, the game that is the same as the one presented above with the exception that each party's delegation contract is observable to the rival party more specifically, when choosing their  effort levels, the delegates know the delegation contracts of both parties. Here we find that the 3 unobservability of delegation contracts narrows, compared with the observable-contracts case, the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation, which in turn leads to several interesting results.
This paper is related to the literature on delegation in contests: See, for example, Baik and Kim (1997) , Warneryd (2000) , Schoonbeek (2002 Schoonbeek ( , 2004 Schoonbeek ( , 2007 , Konrad, Peters, and .. Warneryd (2004) , Lim and Shogren (2004) , Krakel (2005) , Krakel and Sliwka (2006) , Baik .. .. .. (2007 Baik .. .. .. ( , 2008 , Brandauer and Englmaier (2009) , and Baik and Lee (2013) . In this literature, 4 unlike in the current paper, a standard assumption is that, when choosing their effort levels, delegates know the delegation contracts, if any, of the rival parties in other words, public  information is assumed regarding delegation contracts. On the other hand, as in the current paper, most of the above-mentioned papers study delegation in two-player contests, and assume that the delegates' compensation specified in the delegation contracts is conditioned on the outcome of the contest. Baik and Kim (1997) Baik (2007 Baik ( , 2008 considers contests with bilateral delegation in which the delegation contracts are endogenous. Baik and Lee (2013) study contests with bilateral delegation in which the delegates decide endogenously when to expend their effort.
This paper is related also to Baik and Lee (2007) and Nitzan and Ueda (2011) . These papers assume, as in the main model of this paper, that each party chooses its two sequential moves without observing the other parties' moves. The two papers study collective rent seeking between groups in which the players in each group decide first how to share the rent among themselves if they win, and then choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently without observing the sharing rules to which the players in the other groups agreed.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 formulates a game that models a two-player contest with bilateral delegation in which each party's contract is unobservable to the rival party.
In Section 3, solving the game, we obtain the equilibrium contracts and the delegates' equilibrium effort levels. In Section 4, we first obtain all the outcomes of the unobservablecontracts case, and then perform comparative statics of these outcomes with respect to the higher-valuation player's valuation for the prize. In Section 5, we first look at the observablecontracts case. Then we compare the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case. Finally, Section 6 offers our conclusions.
The Main Model: The Unobservable-Contracts Case
Consider a contest between two players, 1 and 2, in which, in order to win a prize, each player hires a delegate to expend effort on her behalf. The contract between a player and her delegate is hidden from the rival party when the two delegates, 1 and 2, choose their effort levels. The 5 probability that a player wins the prize depends on the delegates' effort levels. strategies at the start of the game, the players and the delegates should compute their expected payoffs at the start of the game, forming their beliefs about both parties' contracts and the delegates' effort levels to be chosen.
Finally, we assume that all of the above is common knowledge among the players and delegates.
Equilibrium Contracts and Effort Levels
To solve the game, we need to find a quadruple vector ( , , , ) of actions that satisfies the α α given, player seeks to maximize her expected payoff (2) over her contract , having perfect i α i foresight about ( , ) for each value of . More precisely, player seeks to maximize
with respect to , taking as given. Note that we obtain function (5) using functions (1) and
(2), and delegate 's best response (4). The first-order condition for maximizing function (5) i reduces to
Solving equation (6) for , we obtain player 's best response to delegate 's effort level , which
is denoted by ( ).
We now obtain the reaction functions for the parties. Party has two reaction functions, i one for delegate and one for player . Delegate 's reaction function comes from delegate 's
reaction function is ( ), the implicit form of which is given in equation (6).
Finally, we obtain the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( , , , ), for the α α
game. Because they satisfy all the four reaction functions of the parties simultaneously, we obtain them by solving the following system of four simultaneous equations:
It is computationally intractable to obtain the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( , , , α α
), by substituting player 1's reaction function ( ) into equation (8), and player 2's α α oe reaction function ( ) into equation (10) 
and (14) (1 ) ,
which come from equations (7) through (10), respectively. Next, using equations (11) through (14), we obtain
and (18) (1 ) (2 ).
As the final step, we solve for the unknown , using the relationship and equations (16 
Now, using the above results, we report the equilibrium contracts and effort levels, ( , α
, , ), in Lemma 1 (see Figures 1 and 2 ). α 
.
Note that in Lemma 1 is a positive real for any value of , where 1; it is equal to t ) ) unity for 1; and it is monotonically increasing in . Note also that and do not depend ) ) α α oe parameter , the ratio of the players' valuations (of player 1 to player 2). )
Comparative Statics with respect to the Parameter )
In this section, we first look at the players' contracts, the delegates' effort levels, the players' probabilities of winning, and the expected payoffs of the delegates and the players in the equilibrium of the game. Then, we examine how these outcomes of the game respond when the asymmetry between the players changes that is, we perform comparative statics of these  outcomes with respect to the parameter . )
Let ( , ) represent the probability that player wins the prize in the equilibrium. 
Proposition 2 says that, in equilibrium, the lower-valuation player (player 2) offers her delegate a higher value of than the higher-valuation player, but her delegate (delegate 2) exerts α less effort than his counterpart. This can be explained as follows. Player 2 (the lower-valuation player) offers delegate 2 a higher value of than player 1. However, delegate 2's contingent α compensation is less than delegate 1's that is, because player 2's valuation for   α α Baik and Lee (2013) show that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, the equilibrium total effort level remains unchanged.
17
Another interesting result in Proposition 3 is that, as approaches (plus) infinity, the ) limit of the equilibrium total effort level is . This implies that the equilibrium total effort level v 2 is always less than the valuation of the lower-valuation player. Consider a contest that is the same as the one in Section 2 with the exception that, when choosing their effort levels, the delegates know the contracts of both parties. Specifically, consider the following two-stage game. In the first stage, the players hire delegates and independently write contracts with their delegates, and then they simultaneously announce (and commit to) the contracts that is, player 1 announces publicly the value of , and player 2  α 1 announces the value of . In the second stage, after knowing both contracts, the delegates α 2 18 choose their effort levels simultaneously and independently. The winning player is determined at the end of the second stage, and only the winning player pays compensation to her delegate according to her contract announced in the first stage.
To solve for a subgame-perfect equilibrium of this standard two-stage game, we work backwards. In the second stage, the delegates know the contracts of both parties: the value of α 1 and the value of . Delegate seeks to maximize his expected payoff (3) 
which come from equations (22) and (23), respectively. Next, we solve for the unknown , using k the relationship and equations (24) and (25), which reduce to α α
Finally, substituting a unique positive real root of equation (26) into equations (24) and (25), respectively, we obtain the equilibrium contracts, and , of the players (see Figure 1 ). α α (1) through (3), we obtain Lemmas A1 and A2 in the Appendix (see Figures 1 through 4) . equivalently, unless is extremely large), the lower-) the equilibrium expected payoffs of valuation player and her delegate respectively, in the unobservable-contracts case , are greater than this result, we argue that in the observable-contracts case.
On the basis of the higher-26 valuation player and her delegate prefer the observable-contracts case (to the unobservablecontracts case), while the lower-valuation player and her delegate prefer the unobservablecontracts case. We argue also that is beneficial to the lower-valuation player and her delegate, it but harmful to to the higher-valuation player and her delegate, enact or establish policies or regulations or institutions that require both parties to release the information on their contracts in a two-player contest with bilateral delegation.
Conclusions
We have studied two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which each party's delegation contract is not revealed to (or is hidden from) the rival party when the two delegates choose their effort levels.
In Section 3, we solved the game, treating it as a simultaneous-move game between the two parties. In Section 4, we obtained first the players' contracts, the delegates' effort levels, the players' probabilities of winning, and the expected payoffs of the delegates and the players, in the equilibrium of the game. Then, we examined how these outcomes of the game respond when the valuation parameter changes. In the same section, we showed that, in equilibrium, the )
higher-valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation than her rival does, the expected payoff of the delegate hired by the higher-valuation player is greater than that of his counterpart, and economic rent exists for each delegate. We showed also that, as the valuation for the prize of the higher-valuation player increases, , each player offers her ceteris paribus delegate greater contingent compensation and the equilibrium total effort level increases.
Finally, we showed that the equilibrium total effort level is always less than the valuation for the prize of the lower-valuation player.
In Section 5, to make comparisons, we first studied two-player contests with bilateral delegation in which each party's contract is observable to the rival party. Then, we compared the outcomes of the unobservable-contracts case with those of the observable-contracts case.
Comparing the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation, we found that the highervaluation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation in the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case, whereas the lower-valuation player offers her delegate greater contingent compensation in the unobservable-contracts case than in the observable-contracts case. We found also that the gap between the delegates' equilibrium contingent compensation is narrower in the unobservable-contracts case than in the observablecontracts case. Comparing the equilibrium , we found that the equilibrium total effort levels total effort level is greater than in the unobservable-contracts case in the observable-contracts case.
Finally, comparing the equilibrium expected payoffs, we found that the equilibrium expected payoffs of the higher-valuation player and her delegate in the unobservable-contracts are less case in the observable-contracts case, nless is very much greater than , than whereas, u the v v 1 2 equilibrium expected payoffs of the lower-valuation player and her delegate in the are greater unobservable-contracts case in the observable-contracts case. On the basis of than this result, we have argued that the higher-valuation player and her delegate prefer the observable-contracts case (to the unobservable-contracts case), while the lower-valuation player and her delegate prefer the unobservable-contracts case. We have argued also that is beneficial to the lowerit valuation player and her delegate, the higher-valuation player and her delegate, but harmful to to enact or establish policies or regulations or institutions that require both parties to release their contracts in a two-player contest with bilateral delegation.
In the models that we have studied in this paper, public or private information is exogenously assumed regarding contracts between the players and the delegates. It would be interesting to study an extended model in which the parties decide first whether they will release the information on their delegation contracts. However, that must involve a sizable analysis of four distinct subgames including two unilateral-release subgames in which one party releases the information on its delegation contract, but the other party does not. Furthermore, it must focus on the equilibrium decisions on releasing the information on the delegation contracts, which is beyond the purpose of this paper. Hence, we leave this extension for future research.
In the models that we have studied in this paper, potential delegates have equal ability for the contest. It would be interesting to study corresponding models in which potential delegates have different ability for the contest, and each potential delegate's reservation wage depends on his ability. In this paper, we have assumed that both players hire their delegates. It would be interesting to study corresponding extended models in which the players each have the option of hiring a delegate. We leave them for future research.
Footnotes

1.
A contest is defined as a situation in which players or contestants compete with one another to win a prize. The literature on the theory of contests which deals with rent-seeking  contests, tournaments, litigation, patent contests, sporting contests, all-pay auctions, etc. is  enormous and growing. Important work in this literature includes Tullock (1980) , Rosen (1986), Appelbaum and Katz (1987) , Dixit (1987), Hillman and Riley (1989) , Ellingsen (1991 ), Nitzan (1991 , Baik and Shogren (1992) , Baye, Kovenock, and de Vries (1993) , Clark and Riis (1998) 
2.
We treat the game as a simultaneous-move game between the two parties because, in the game, each party chooses its two sequential moves without observing the other party's moves.
3.
In this paper, by the situation of "observable contracts," we mean a situation in which the players announce publicly their delegation contracts and, furthermore, are committed to their delegation contracts.
4.
Important work in the literature on delegation that does not study contests includes Schelling (1960), Fershtman and Judd (1987) , Sklivas (1987), Fershtman, Judd, and Kalai (1991) , and Katz (1991) , (2006).
5
. Katz (1991) shows that strategic effects may not be present with delegation if contracts are unobservable. Thus one may well say that, in this model, a main motive for delegation is not for the players to achieve strategic commitments through delegation. Delegation may occur here because the players want to use superior ability of their delegates, and/or delegation is compulsory.
6. Specifically, player designs and offers a contract, which delegate accepts. i i
7.
Overall, the two parties play a simultaneous-move game, whatever the chronological timing of their decisions may be: Each party chooses its two sequential actions specifically, a  contract and then an effort level without observing those chosen by the rival party. According  to Baik and Lee (2007) , the game is classified as a simultaneous-move game with sequential moves. Clearly, it differs from a standard two-stage game in which the first move of each party is by the rival party before the second moves of the parties are made. observed
8.
Instead, we could assume that player pays delegate compensation of if she wins i i v α i i the prize, and if she loses it, where 0 and 1 (see Baik, 2007 Baik, , 2008 . In this
alternative contract specification, one may consider as fixed compensation (or a fixed fee)
that is paid to delegate , regardless of the outcome of the contest, and ( ) as contingent i v α "
 compensation (or a contingent fee) which is paid to delegate only if she wins the prize. Using i the alternative contract specification, however, we obtain exactly the same (main) results, because the value of subject to the nonnegativity constraint on that player offers and
delegate accepts in equilibrium is zero. i
9.
This contest success function is extensively used in the literature on the theory of contests. Examples include Tullock (1980), Appelbaum and Katz (1987) , Hillman and Riley (1989), Nitzan (1991) , Baik and Kim (1997) , Hurley and Shogren (1998 ), Schoonbeek (2002 , 2004 , Lim and Shogren (2004) , Baik (2004 Baik ( , 2007 Baik ( , 2008 , Baik and Lee (2007) , and Baik and Lee (2013 
10.
Throughout the paper, when we use and at the same time, we mean that . i j i j Á
11.
We find each player's contract and each delegate's effort level that are specified in a sequential equilibrium and also in a perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
12.
Each player's decision on her contract is not affected by her beliefs about the directly rival party's contract. This is because the player's expected payoff does not depend on directly the rival party's contract and because the two parties play a simultaneous-move game.
13.
Note that player 's best response to ( , ) and delegate 's best response to ( , ) i 14.
It is straightforward to see that in (3) is strictly concave in , and thus the second-1 i i x order condition for maximizing (3) is satisfied. Incidentally, the second-order condition is satisfied for every maximization problem in the paper; for brevity that is not stated explicitly in each case.
15.
We use the computer program Mathematica to solve for the unknown . t
16.
Schoonbeek (2002), Baik (2007 Baik ( , 2008 , and Baik and Lee (2013) show that economic rent for the delegate or delegates may exist.
17.
On the other hand, Baik (2004) shows in two-player simultaneous-move asymmetric contests without delegation that, as the valuation of the higher-valuation player increases, the equilibrium total effort level increases.
18.
The contracts may not have strategic effects if they are not perfectly observed by the delegates (see, for example, Bagwell, 1995) .
19.
The Nash equilibrium of the second-stage subgame satisfies the delegates' reaction functions simultaneously. Geometrically speaking, it occurs at the intersection of the delegates' reaction functions.
20.
We use the computer program Mathematica to solve for the unknown . k
21.
If is less than approximately 4.0755, then we obtain (see Figure 2) . If is less ) ) x x 1 1 * * *  than approximately 9.5, then we obtain (see Figure 4) . G G * * * 2 2  22.
In the literature on strategic delegation, there have been debates on whether strategic effects are present with delegation when contracts are unobservable. For an excellent survey of this and other related issues, see Gal-Or (1997) . In this paper, player 1 makes her delegate more aggressive or motivated in the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case, which may indicate that strategic effects may not be present with delegation when contracts are unobservable. On the other hand, player 2 makes her delegate less aggressive or motivated in the observable-contracts case than in the unobservable-contracts case, which may indicate that strategic effects may be present with delegation when contracts are unobservable.
23.
Using Propositions 2 and 4, we obtain also the fact that the unobservability of contracts narrows, compared with the observable-contracts case, the gap between the delegates' equilibrium expected payoffs and the gap between the players' equilibrium expected payoffs: In terms of the symbols, and, unless is extremely large, 24. Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) study duopolies with strategic managerial delegation in which, when choosing their actions, the two managers know the delegation contracts of both firms. They find that, as compared with the no-delegation situation, bilateral delegation increases outputs if the firms engage in quantity competition, and increases prices if the firms engage in price competition. In the models, outputs are regarded as strategic substitutes, while prices are regarded as strategic complements. In this paper, bilateral delegation in the unobservable-contracts case and in the observablereduces total effort both contracts case, as compared with the no-delegation situation. However, both players do not regard their effort as strategic complements.
25.
In the literature on contests, effort expended in rent-seeking contests is interpreted as social costs.
26.
One may say that ignorance is bliss to the lower-valuation player and her delegate. 
(1 ) (1 2 ) oe oe player 2). Lemmas A1 and A2 are also reported, but without providing their full derivations, in Appendix B in Baik and Lee (2013) .
